Taking Down Tanking

No strategy in sports management has come under more scrutiny in recent years than tanking, the process by which teams purposely lose to gain a higher selection in the next year’s draft and therefore a more talented prospect. The merits and drawbacks of tanking have been greatly contested, with proponents of the strategy citing its success throughout sports history, while critics claim that tanking ruins the competitiveness of sports and perpetuates an unfair draft system. The system already skews the balance of power too far into the hands of teams, leaving draftees with little to no choice for their place in the league during the beginning of their careers.

Admittedly, many teams have tanked successfully. For example, the 1983-1984 Houston Rockets and Pittsburgh Penguins each purposely lost a sizable portion of their games, and in return for their abysmal seasons, they were rewarded with franchise-altering players. The Rockets selected Hakeem Olajuwon with their first overall pick, who went on to deliver 17 phenomenal seasons, becoming one of the best centers in NBA history. Meanwhile, center Mario Lemieux, the Penguins’ first overall selection, spurred a decades-long dynasty in Pittsburgh and amassed a career that trailed only Wayne Gretzky in grandeur.

Many teams in recent history have pursued the success the Penguins and Rockets enjoyed by tanking. The process became more prevalent as scouting became more prominent and vigorous, at least for the high-end talent in most drafts. Through tanking, the San Antonio Spurs drafted Tim Duncan, the Cleveland Cavaliers acquired hometown franchise cornerstone LeBron James, and the Penguins obtained Evgeni Malkin and Sidney Crosby. More recently, the NHL’s two best players, Connor McDavid and Auston Matthews, and one of the NBA’s top centers, Joel Embiid, each went to their respective teams as a result of tanking. The strategy clearly has its merits: these generational players have the ability to completely alter the outlook of a franchise.

Arguably the most dramatic tank in history was the four-year project the Astros underwent. After snagging outfielder George Springer in 2011, the Astros drafted touted shortstop Carlos Correa at first overall in 2012 and third baseman Alex Bregman at second overall in 2015. Both selections evolved into impactful players for the Astros, but the tank was not spotless. The team only hit on one of their three first overall picks from 2012-2014, highlighting one of the many faults of tanking: the uncertainty of the draft.

Scouts do not have an enviable job. Predicting the outcomes of players’ entire careers when they are teenagers is virtually impossible. A host of different factors could contribute to a top draft selection not meeting their projection: career-derailing injuries, poor team development, and, most prominently, post-draft pressure. The expectation that a team and its fanbase place on a player to carry them from the abyss to the promised land is, understandably, too much for an 18-year-old or 20-year-old to handle. Certain players thrive while having what feels like the weight of the world on their shoulders, but the rank and file don’t, failing to meet unattainable expectations placed on them by their teams. Their failure is compounded by discussions about being a “bust” and follows them for much of their careers, preventing them from reaching their potential. Trajectories like this one are, sadly, all too common, making drafting a risky and imperfect process, especially for players with a quality scouting report.

Judging an entire career based on high school or college performance is simply not feasible. In addition to the many game-related factors that influence how impactful a player becomes, many high-end picks simply don’t pan out as they were projected to. Alternatively, by either sheer luck or phenomenal scouting, the draft’s top player emerges in a later pick. In the Olajuwon draft, for example, Michael Jordan was picked third. No one is complaining about the career Olajuwon strung together for the Rockets, but Jordan was Jordan.

With this unpredictability in mind, putting on a deliberately abysmal season to get a high pick feels far too risky to be so popular. Teams place the fate of their franchise in the hands of teenagers and, in order to do so, remove the competitiveness of sports. Tanking adds a level of predictability, making highly contested games before playoffs boring and formulaic. If two teams competing for a playoff spot are separated by a game, and one has to face a tanking team while the other has to face a playoff team, the decision is essentially predetermined: the team facing the tanking team has a practically guaranteed win and playoff seed.

Additionally, tanking hurts the players on both sides of the team. In professional sports, players are inherently driven to win. Being told to lose is a complicated reality for professionals to navigate and effaces the adrenaline rush of sports. Players stop having fun playing their sport and can even lose their love for the game. John Wall’s 2021-2022 season is the most extreme example of this conflict. The rebuilding Rockets decided to significantly reduce his playing time en route to a high draft pick. Amid these disagreements, Wall refused to play in the beginning of the season and was then shut down entirely by the team. Essentially, Wall lost an entire year of his career because the Rockets insisted on being bad.

Tanking doesn’t just hurt players in professional leagues, though. Players being drafted by these teams don’t enter the league set up for success. Draftees have been training for their entire lives to have a shot at going professional, only to join a team that has no title aspirations. It’s unfair to expect them to perform with little to no support from the rest of the team, especially when that team is characterized by a culture complacent with defeat. All in all, tanking fails to develop players and maintain an adequate team culture.

Team culture also manifests itself within and outside of an organization. While fans tend to support their team through rebuilds, they lose interest when their team is intentionally losing, as a New York Post poll concluded. Because fan attendance makes up a sizable portion of organizational income, losing fans simply means losing revenue for management. Rebuilding is inevitable and part of a team’s life cycle, but deliberate tanking is not, and the player-related risks are only compounded by the financial risks for organizations.

Major leagues have implemented different solutions to discourage tanking––with the NBA, NHL, and MLB utilizing draft lotteries––but the vast majority are riddled with flaws. Instead of the draft lottery, leagues should incorporate a strategy whereby high-end prospects select their team. As opposed to earning the highest draft slot, the best prospects earn the right to choose their team. The best-ranked prospect has their pick of every team, the second-best selects from every team but the first chosen, continuing until each of the top 30 or so players have chosen. From there, a standard, standing-based draft ensues. This idea places players’ futures into their hands, rather than a team’s, and rewards talent with opportunity.

One thing is clear: tanking benefits no one. The strategy spoils competition, plummets revenues and fan interest, and further eliminates players’ early career freedom. It’s time for tanking to tank.