The Fall of America

In 1989, political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote a famous essay titled, “The End of History?” In it, he argued that the unchecked spread of capitalism and democracy throughout the world meant that human socioeconomic evolution had reached its end—Western democracy would be the “final form of human government.”

Never have his words rung more hollow. An expansionist authoritarian regime in Russia and a similarly autocratic Chinese superpower pose an increasingly dangerous threat to America’s global hegemony. In addition to America's internal issues, the rise of these totalitarian states signifies the end of American global dominance and a retreat of liberal democracy.

When Fukuyama wrote his essay, his prediction was certainly understandable. America was the world’s sole superpower, and free market democracy seemed to represent the objectively best form of government. Throughout the Second World War, and later the Cold War, America defeated both fascism and Communism and placed itself in a unique position as the strongest nation in the world. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse, and other nations such as China were liberalizing.

By the early 2000s, however, cracks were beginning to show. Foreign policy blunders and America’s failure to establish a functioning government in Afghanistan undermined global confidence in America’s ability as leader of the free world. Additionally, increasingly partisan politics and a burgeoning debt threatened to create budgeting problems. Even more concerning was China’s rapidly growing economy, which had surpassed both Germany and Japan by purchasing power parity (the size of an economy adjusted for the average cost of living) and was rapidly catching up to the US with double-digit economic growth rates.

Today, China is in prime position to replace America as the world’s superpower. With the election of President Donald Trump, worldwide favorability ratings of the US have decreased from around 65 percent to 50 percent, according to a Pew Research Center poll of 37 nations across the globe. This change has been even more pronounced in long-standing American allies: in Germany, for example, confidence in the President’s ability to do “the right thing” crashed from 86 percent to 11 percent, mirroring figures in nations like Canada and Japan.

Increased welfare spending necessitated by an aging population as well as a national debt totaling over 100 percent of the GDP have crippled America’s ability to exercise influence abroad. From Turkey to Bangladesh, Russia to Venezuela, democratic governments are being replaced by authoritarian regimes.

Three years ago, China surpassed America as the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity. Today, China continues to try to spread its influence in Asia and beyond as President Xi Jinping consolidates absolute power in his hands. The Communist Party is investing in an ambitious “Belt and Road” initiative to link China to Europe through the ancient Silk Road route. The more subtle goal is to bring weaker Central Asian economies into China’s sphere of influence. Meanwhile, rapid island building inside of the “9-dash-line,” a vague territorial claim over large parts of the South China Sea made by the Republic of China in 1947, gives China more control over that strategically vital region of the world.

The Obama Administration attempted to respond to the growing threat posed by China with a “Pivot to Asia,” a refocusing of diplomatic and military resources from the Middle East to the Asian region. However, due to budget constraints and other commitments, it failed to make a practical difference in Asian geopolitics. The Trans Pacific Partnership, a controversial economic partnership between the US and eleven Asian nations, as well as the one major achievement of the Pivot to Asia, was killed by President Trump in the first month of his tenure as President. The stark contrast between the swift and decisive action that Xi Jinping can take and the ponderous infighting the federal government in Washington preoccupies itself with on a daily basis calls into question whether China’s political system is superior to America’s in gaining international influence and power, if not in guaranteeing personal and economic freedoms.

There are also concerns that America’s military is losing its edge. The nation’s highest ranking military official, Joseph Dunford, said that without a significant increase in military spending, “we will lose our qualitative and our quantitative competitive advantage.” Russia and China have invested heavily in countering American assets and military strategies, especially through electronic warfare systems. Perhaps more worryingly, America has not invested in new technologies to maintain its historical edge over rival nations and is instead focusing on counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the present moment, it is almost inevitable that America will fall from the position of power and prestige it currently occupies. Future governments will have to contend with the new position that America will occupy in the world. America’s reign has undoubtedly had some negative impacts, with numerous undemocratic interventions or invasions of other nations. But for decades, a strong network of alliances, aid to developing nations and a commitment to organizations like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization have created an American led, rules-based global order that has allowed the global economy to thrive in relative peace. As China replaces the US as the global superpower, that could change.

However, America can still prosper in its new position. The West’s military power still far outpaces that of other regimes. China’s Belt and Road scheme has encountered early problems, and its island-building has been met with international condemnation. And in Russia and China and nations around the world, activists continue to push for basic human rights and democracy.

In 2014, the 25th anniversary of his original essay, Fukuyama wrote a piece in the Wall Street Journal updating his position. He stated that he was “less idealistic” than he had been back in 1989. However, he still maintained that there was no viable alternative to liberal democracy in the world. Time will tell if he is correct.